on the meagre literature despite the widely scattered distribuition of the svndrome. The term "depersonalization" was first uscd by DuIgas [2] in 1899, to name a svndrome originally described bv Krishaber [3] in 1872 under the title of cerebro-cardiac neurosis. The definition of the term as conceived bv different writers tends to be a descriptive one, each stressing particuLlar aspects according to his special approach. Thus Schilder [4] in 1914 says: "The individua.l feels totally different from the previous being; he does not recognize himself as a person, the outside world appears to him foreign, the 'self' does not behave any more in the former way." Oesterreich [5] views it more from the standpoint of affect, thuis: "There is a diminutio.i or complete disappearance of feeling, the individual's sense of living is gone, the central life sense is checked." Janet [6] observes that "depersonalization takes place when the individual does not recognize the maximum of consciousness and of realitv, and depersonalization is nothing else but an internal perception of the disturbance in the function of realitv, or else a dissolution of attention and therefore a release of automatic activity." Wiersma [7] defines depersonalization as "a sud(denly occturriiag rapidly passing state in which everything in the environment is perceived vagUely and indistinctly. The complaint is not infrequentlv heard that everything, though wvell perceived, is with difficulty recognized. The voices of others, and also of the person himself, are plainly heard but not recognized. It is as if the perceptions are duly accomplished, but the associations which thev arouse in normal circumstances are not formed. The patients complain that thev cannot think properly, that they cannot reflect; they feel dull and dazed, and ihe examination shows thev have difficulty in answvering questions". Krapf [8] says of the syndrome: "The individual expresses himself as strange, his perceptions insufficient, his feelings emptv, his thoughts shallow withouit relief, his acts automatic. It has been remarked for long that the strangeniess is a faraway perception.
tumour and trauma [14] , athetosis, hypoparathyroidism, carbon-monoxide, poisoning [15] and mescalin intoxication [16] .
The mechanism of depersonalization has been approached from psychological and neurological view-points, and a diversity of theories have been advanced by descriptive psychiatrists, psycho-analysts and neurologists. Mayer-Gross has suggested that it is a dysfunction of cerebral origin, and is a preformed functional response of the brain. He also suggested that modern physiological methods should be used to elucidate the mechanism, and this we have attempted to do. We can only briefly refer to some of the important psycho-analytical views. Gordon [17] broadly describes the syndrome as a converted representation of hidden or repressed emotional consciousness by a special determination. Schilder [18] stresses the shift of the libido in these patients, and its partial concentration on a scrutinizing tendency. Nunberg [19] believes it to represent a loss of libidinal attachment as a result of physical punishment and a narcissistic wound. Sadger [20] states it may be an attempt to escape psychic castration, and Searl [21] regards it as an attempt to escape psychical and physical punishment by possessing the immunity of inanimate objects. Freud [22] makes his first mention of the subject of estrangement and depersonalization in 1937, noting two general characteristics, first, that they belong to the defence mechanisms tending to hide something from the ego-estrangement, or denying a portion of the ego-and secondly, that they are rooted in the early past of the individual. Feigenbaum [23] points out that depersonalization is seen to serve as a means of defence-namely, by projection. Oberndorf [24] has written a series of papers on the subject, stressing four successive mechanisms: parental identification; erotization of thought; identification of such thinking as a characteristic of the parent of the opposite sex; and repression. Wittels [25] also suggests that the important mechanism is the use of identification in the formation of personality. He says: "It seems to me that the cause of depersonalization is an unusually great number of phantom figures, leaving the ego in such a position that it cannot decide which one of the figures has to be acknowledged as its representative. In terms of the libido theory we could say insufficient ego libido is invested in any one of these phantoms. Hence they are all grey and colourless, surrounding a perplexed and swaying personality. In all cases of depersonalization under my observation something was wrong in the infantile relation between the patient and the father. It does seem to me as though the super-ego is responsible for the disintegration of personality by condemning all of the phantoms without exception as unreal. " Neurologists have attempted to explain the syndrome in terms of local cerebral function, although no pathological changes are found in cases of depersonalization as we understand them. They point out the close association of depersonalization and the phenomena of deja vu, and also the connexion between disturbances in the "body schema" and its representation in the cortex [26, 27, 28, 29] . This "body schema" or "body pattern" is the concept which a person has of the image of his own body, or that of another, and the spatial relations of the parts of the body to each other. The body image is intimately associated with the cerebral cortex especially the inferior parietal, marginal, and angular gyri, and in the case of focal lesions loss of the body image may occur, but the patient may not be aware of its disturbance; nor need it interfere with motor function Such lesions do not necessarily affect projection tracts, but involve association systems and cause genuine disturbance of the psyche [30] . Thus, in anosoghosia, first described by Babinski [31] , in which condition an individual is unaware of his own disease, there is a specific defect in body image. Defects in body image are common in neurological and psychiatric conditions. Barkman [32] showed that the hemiplegic anosognosia described by Babinski, was due to a lesion of the right thalamus;
and Olsen and Ruby [33] state that anosognosia may arise in three distinct situations, namelv a lesion of the thalamus, a lesion of the thalamoparietal peduncle, or a combination of motor cortical lesion and an interparietal lesion. Anton [34] in 1899 described a condition of failing perception which consisted of Dabinski's anosognosia and the lack of recognition of blindness and deafness, In Gerstmann's syndrome [35] , or finger agnosia, the body schema is affected by a focal cerebral lesion in one hemisphere only, the hemisphere concerned with the individual finger. This occurs in lesions of the angular gyrus. The patient's psychic condition is good, but may be disturbed for a time. Bender and Kanzer [36] describe a dreamlike state of unreality occurring in a parieto-occipital tumour, with disturbance in the perception of forms, and spatial order of objects, and in the orientation of the patient in space. Russell Brain [37] describes three cases of a distinct form of visual disorientation resulting from a lesion of the posterior half of the right cerebral hemisphere, and characterized by an inattention to the left half of external space. Significant contributions to the problem of disorder of the body image in psychiatry have been made by Gurewicz [38] on the "interparietal syndrome" which is characterized by two types of phenomena; disorders in the bodv image, and metamorphosia. Bychowski [39] reviews the study of the body image and says the Vienna School attempted to take into consideration tne psycho-analytical view-point. This view-point attributes to narcissistic motives the fact that the patient refuses to admit to himself that his extremity is missing. The phenomenon of anosognosia has been related by Potzl [40] and Schilder with the role of repression. It must be pointed out that in all the above neurological conditions, the condition is a sign of loss of function which can onlv be demonstrated by testing. In depersonalization, however, the condition is a symptom complained of by the patient; the difference therefore is between a sign and a symptom, or difference between a disorder at the level of behaviour and a disorder at the level of experience.
Clinical Findings. This investigation is based on a series of 66 cases recently examined and treated in the Sutton Emergency Hospital neuropsychiatric unit, and in the psychiatric out-patient departments of four London hospitals. There was no age selection, but we have excluded severe psychotics and involutional depressives, although we know the symptom is common amongst them. WVe have confined ourselves almost entirely tc cases in which depersonalization is either the presenting symptom, or plays a leading part in the symptomatology, or is a clinical entity, in all of which the patients understand the morbid nature of their state. The value of our selection is that we have a clear picture of the symptoms studied and many cases will fit into no other diagnosis than the depersonalization syndrome. Practically all cases were leading a comparatively normal life prior to the onset. In the history-taking, particular attention was paid to the patient's description of the symptoms, often supplemented by a written account of his attitude to the symptoms.
Care was taken as far as possible to avoid leading questions, and a verbatim account of the patient's statements was taken at the interviews. Each case had a full psychiatric investigation, and physique, personality development and intelligence were assessed. Miss J. M. Moore, psychiatric social worker, supplied social and family histories in most of the cases, visited the homes and interviewed near relatives. Special investigations carried out included the Rorschach test in 18 male and 22 female cases, the electroencephalogram was recorded in 23, and Miss Elizabeth Bennett did a series of imagerv type assessments. The 66 cases comprise 46 females and 20 males. The voungest age of onset was 10, the oldest 38; the average age of onset in women being 24-5 vears, and in men 23-5 years. 20 cases began under the age of 20, 30 cases between the ages of 20 and 30, and 16 cases from 30 to 40. A quarter of the cases had a sudden onset of depersonalization between the ages of 15 and 19. It is impossible to give a composite survey of the duration of symptoms as the majority of the cases are still depersonalized. Some cases have had recurrent attacks of varying duration, others have remained persistently depersonalized for many years with or without marked fluctuations in its course.
Thus one patient has had recurrent attacks for twentv-six years, another for twenty-three years, and 7 patients have been persistently depersonalized for seven years. 2 cases have up to date a persistent duration of symptoms of nine years; I of eleven years; 2 of thirteen years. One patient has had a fluctuating course over twenty-seven years, and another in a similar wav over twelve years. It must be emphasized that affective disorder could not be regarded as primary in these cases. The physique of patients varied in type, but the majority are of asthenic or athletic habittus. A point of possible interest in the previous medical history is that 9 cases had rheumatic fever in childhood and many others had recurrent attacks of tonsillitis and bad throats.
All descriptions of tl-he symptnm fall naturallv into those of changes of the self, or changes of the ou-ter wi)rld. In the latter, attempts to classify cases into those experienc-ing a loss, those a change, and those an addition to the outer world, showed that addition is very rare, and that the same patient would at times speak as if the environment had something missing in it, and at others as if the qualit) of his perceived experience had changed. Again there was no clear distinction to be drawn between derealization and depersonalization. Whereas we have not found derealization without depersonalization, the reverse occurred in a few cases. In the majority, the patient would complain at different times in terms of altered experience of self, or of the outer world, but would lay emphasis on one or the other. In our attempts to elucidate differences of this type we have recorded verbatim patients' descriptions of their symptoms, but in practice it becomes clear that patients have the greatest difficulty in communicating their experiences. Such communications do not readily lend themselves to objective divisions of this sort. This may be due either to the complex nature of the experience, or possibly to the fact that it is difficult to put into words. This may explain why the best descriptions are given by the most intelligent patients.
Fear, and the experience of being misunderstood, or being thought insane, have led many patients to suppress this symptom, and to complain of accompanying somatic changes. Such patients are often diagnosed as affective disorders.
Out of the 66 cases, 61 had a sudden onset, 3 cases were doubtful and in 2 the onset was gradual. Intelligent people describe the onset of the experience of unreality in a number of different ways, or in a composite way which would fulfil the criteria of more than one theory. Thus one patient said: "Suddenly everything was strange, unreal, and I was a different person." Another said: "Everything suddenly went black. It was as though something had snapped, and from-then on things seemed different." A few random descriptions include: "I suddenly felt peculiar.' "I suddenly felt I was dead." "It was as if my brain turned right over, and it left me with a dreamy confused and bewildered feeling." I suddenly could not think what I was saying. I could not focus. I was talking to someone and yet I was there and not there." "I wondered whether I looked the same. I kept repeating to my husband: 'Am I the same? do I look the same?'" "I was walking down the stairs one day when half my mind seemed to go. I kept looking at things to see if anything went back to normal, to see if they were in their original perspective."
In some cases the symptom is first of momentary duration, and then may recur at intervals, lasting longer each time, finally becoming stationary; or the condition may continue unvarying. The symptom frequently sets up a panic state, and it is common for patients to complain from that time of fears of insanity, of impending death, and particularly of fears of going out alone, and inability to travel. The initial onset is frequently accompanied by overbreathing or difficulty in breathing, a feeling of faintness without an actual faint, and numerous somatic symptoms of anxiety. An interesting observation is the frequency with which depersonalization begins during a period of relaxation following prolonged fatigue or psychological stress or both. In our series it is commonly found to commence after such conditions, for instance when on holiday, or in the change over from an arduous or unpleasant job to a lighter or more congenial one, or in soldiers during leave, after demobilization, or awaiting return home from abroad. One patient had a very worrying time over the question of marriage which she did not desire, and the attack began a week after her fiance was sent overseas; whilst another patient who had badly missed her soldier-husband had an attack when he was home on leave. One patient, after being evacuated from home for years, had tramped the streets of London for weeks trying to find a place in which to live, and the attack came on four days after resting at her sister's home. Another patient had had little rest during the "blitz" and became depersonalized soon after evacuation to the country.
Other cases followed broken engagements, and one after the termination of a homosexual love-affair of many years' duration and of a very unsatisfying nature. An obsessional individual with fears of dirt contiacted pediculi pubis, and he went through severe stress; he became depersonalized during a period of intense relief following the cure of his skin trouble. An obsessional young woman who was very harassed by a nagging motherin-law, and worried by her infant's thrush, became ill after she left for her own home and the baby's -condition cleared up. A highly intelligent, strongly obsessional man of 31 who obtained a first-class honours degree in economics after intensive study in the evenings-he was a wage earner by day-became preoccupied with abdominal pains due to a spastic colon and mucus colitis. His condition was complicated by attacks of migraine and after an unsuccessful course of analytical treatment he was admitted to hospital in a tense agitated state. He responded well to physical treatment and rest. but became depersonalized a month later. 8 cases followed within two to six weeks of parturition. In these cases there had been severe psychological and physical stress during the pregnancy. 6 cases followed operations (with anxsthesia), and a few followed some days after minor injuries to the head. One pregnant woman became depersonalized whilst looking at some pictures in the National Gallery, after she had been taking massive doses of abortifacients and had given up the idea of successfully inducing an abortion. Another pregnant women stated that it followed the taking of salicylates, and another patient was taking 15 grains of thyroid daily to reduce her weight before the onset of symptoms.
Unlike most psychiatric conditions some patients find that when they concentrate the symptom recedes and when they relax it returns; as one patient says: "I concentrate and get things back a little, but the strain is too strong and as soon as I relax everything has gone again. I felt an attack coming on after my third confinement, but beat it this time by keeping my mind working." One voung man had been almost continuously depersonalized for eight years. He said he felt worse when relaxed and all right it occupied. He supposed he was the only person who wvould welcome, for instance, a fire, as the excitement would relieve his symptoms, The happiest period of his life was when the Gestapo were after nim and he was hiiding or moving about, living on wheat ears and dry meat. He was symptom-free then.
Our data fully substantiates the attitude taken by Mayer-Gross that it is possible to find support for a varietv of theories about depersonalization by selecting suitable descriptions. He describes under the heading of theories from incomplete data the following: 
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(1) Altered experience of time (Lewis [41] ). Professor Aubrey Lewis has pointed out that time consciousness "is an aspect of all conscious activity; it is essential to all realitv. In detja vi2 there is a brief inability to actualize the present, which in consequence is projected into the past". Of time disturbances in depersonalization he savs: "They illustrate many of the outstanding features of the disorder; the inability to evoke the past readily or clearly, to distinguish the present from the past or future; there is paradoxically the increased quickness, with which time passes though it seems to drag along, the seeming remoteness of the recent past, the unconfirmed feeling of inabilitv to judge the length of time. In depersonalization there is a change in space and time consciousness which may be expressed in various forms."
We have found altered experience of time in 22 cases and they fit in well with Professor Lewis's observations. One patient stated: "The times have gone. I can remember but there is nothing in that. rhe day is gone and it is empty. Time is gone, is a blank I have been here ten days and it seems I've been here no time at all." Another patient said: "When I do anvthing it seems such a long time ago. If I do anything in the morning it seems like weeks ago. Time does not mean anything; it seems long drawn oult."
Twentv-one cases (lescribed clhanges in perception of space. For example: "Everything arouLnd me was far away and tiny", or "When I walk the ground seems to be high up. If I put anvthing down it seems to come towards me", or "The garden simply receded and looked like a scene on the stage." Twentv-two cases described lack of affect. "The emotional part of my brain is dead.
My feelings are peculiar, I feel dead. Whereas things worried me nothing does now.
My husband is there but he is part of the furniture. I don't feel I can worry. All my emotions are blunted."
Fortv-five cases showed subjective experience of bodily change. "Queer sensations connected with mv breathing. I am conscious of not breathing like other people and feel myself on occasions taking deep breaths which don't come easily. My head and my breathing is in a muddle." Thirty cases seemed to show loss of the specific feelings which accompany action. "If I laugh when somebodv makes a joke it is automatic. There just doesn't seem anything there." "I sing but I can't get the feeling of happiness. I lie in bed and get up and feel all numbed but I do my work." "I am still here now and talking to you and touching things but not in the same way as before I was ill." Six cases showed disturbances in memory. "If I go outside I shall not remember you. I have clothes but I can't memorize them, unless I go and strain and look at them." Self-observation although common enough is occasionally expressed in a striking manner: "It is as if I was looking inside my head instead of outside. I seem to be thinking always inside of me instead of out of me." "I suddenly seemed to see myself.
I am conscious of my hands."
Twenty cases complained of changes of clearness and range of consciousness. "I just sink into a kind of unconsciousness. I am just conscious enough to know that things are going on around me but nothifsg seems to register." "I am in a daze." "I seem to be looking through a mist." "Muzzy sensations." "In a dream." "Dopey." "In a fog" -are common expressions.
Disturbances in autonomic function are common in our series. Frequent expressions are: "I have difficulty in breathing and an empty feeling in the pit of the stomach." "A choking sensation and difficult to breathe with giddiness as if I am going to faint." "My stomach shakes."
The number of cases and quotations illustrating the disturbances in function integrating the personality have been obtained from the case records, and must obviously represent minimal percentages of the total cases. Individual cases describing some of these disturbances probably experience some other changes but have omitted to mention them at interviews, particularly so because of the care we h'ave taken to avoid leading questions.
A few of our cases show disturbances in all the tabulated features. Having presented selected data from patients' accounts which support well enough the theories of depersonalization mentioned, we now wish to emphasize that the complaints are not restricted in this way. The actual expression of the symptom is undoubtedly dependent on the intelligence, temperament and cultural background of the patient. rhe range of actual experience of depersonalization varies from mild changes in "self" to the extreme of feeling two persons, and it is worth quoting some verbatim accounts.
A young woman stated: "I can't think it is me. I used to feel I was soeneonl. It never entered my head I was someone else, as though I had changed. I must be someone, I am someone, everybody else feels someone, but I am not myself. I suddenly felt I am in half, there is two Qf me. The two halves of my body felt they had become apart."
As Mayer-Gross pointed out, cases of severe bodily depersonalization may be unaccompanied by derealization. One young man of 20 said: "I can't seem to find my actual self. I feel as though my deliberations are those of a public body or corpcration. rather than those of a person. I used to say 'we' rather than 'I'. It is as though I had transcended personality, as if 'myself' had receded to an image which I regarded objectivelv, and which is not identified with the whole of me". Another patient stated: "I am not living in'a world at all. When looking in a mirror I have to keep telling myself the reflection 'is mine. It's like looking at another,person." Depersonalization of parts of the body, especially head or limbs, are very common. Descriptions include: "The top of my head is popping and buzzing and then it seems to go all numb." "I could look down at my hands and see them writing but they don't seem to belong to me." Patients frequently describe the experience of something between their eyes and the outside world-"curtain", "blind", "fine wire netting", "fine mesh", "glass wall" are some of the expressions used, and it is common to complain of circles before the eyes. This is bound up with descriptions of experience of change in the outside world that is, derealization. "If I am walking along, round things look distorted and something different. When walking it is as though there is nothing there. There seemed to be some kind of barrier between me and the others, it was almost as if I were under water and I could just see distorted shapes around me. In f:act, the people and things around vou seem as unreal to you as if you were only dreaming about them." Or "I look at people, the sun, the flowers, everything looks different." "Through the eyes I look out at a world that might be a pictuire of the world, of objects vaguely unreal till. 1 touch.them-a mirrored reflection." Some patients Gomplain vividly of their inabilitv to visualize. "When you walk into a room you can see a woman there but vou have also a mental picture of the room and that's what I don't have. I can see the furniture, but I can't make a mental picture." "One of my chief worries is the fact that I cannot make any mental picture. If I shut my eyes, for instance, it is like a complete blackout, there are no thoughts coming through at all." Miss Elizabeth Bennett gave imagery tests to 16 cases. She reports that the majority of these patients are predominantly visualizers, a finding which is of no significance, since this is by far the most frequent type in the general population. A few patients have complained of loss of visual imagery, and in two cases this is considered to have been genuline and specific. In the remainder, however, it was found to be a part of a general difficultv in concentrating attention; to a marked visualizer, such a difficulty wouIld naturally be expressed in terms of loss of visual imagery. Investigations of the realitv sense showed that in the majority of cases where the external world appears unreal, it appears so equally in all sense modalities. In two cases, however, visual perceptions seemed to be especially affected, things heard or touched retaining their reality quality.
Tests for body image showed that the majority of patients did not locate themselves in any particular part of the body. Among those who did, the head was the most favoured site. There were some exceptionally vivid visual images of structural damage to the brain, which damage was equated with irreparable loss of the self.
Our patients use the terms "as if" or "as though" showing there is no delusional content, but remarks are made at times which suggest the basis for the formation of ,econdary delusions, hallucinations, and ideas of reference in obviously psychotic patients. Thus one patient stated: "I have a feeling I am speaking very loudly to people and they are looking at me in a surprised sort of fashion. This is a silly idea to explain, but I have the feeling that people, even when I am not speaking, are looking at me in surprise" so illustrating the beginnings of ideas of reference. Another patient similarly failed to return to work because her workmates commented on her appearance. "I pick up things said bv others. I take notice of all nonsense although I know it is silly." Another patient showed the germs of delusions and hallucinations. Something inside him said "Hope is gone". He felt he was a strange monster and had distressing somatic symptoms such as things flailing about inside him and others which were indescribable".
Hvsterical phenomena such as overbreathing, hysterical tetany, or difficulty in swallowing may be a prelude to depersonalization; they may be intermingled with symptoms of depersonalization or it may be expressed as such symptoms, and it is relatively common for hysterical behaviour, and rarely psychogenic amnesias, to follow improvement of the lepersonalized state. 13 20 Anxiety.
... ...
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Migraine ... 24 38 Hypochondriasis .8 13 Deja vu .
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Abnormal father relationship ... 32 out of 48 cases As already stressed the type of case we are presenting shows the depersonalization syndrome as a more or less distinct clinical entity with a sudden onset in non-psychotic patients. A study of the previous personality in these patients is revealing. 56 out of 63 patients (or 88%) showed an obsessional personality, 27 (or 43%) mildly so, and 29 (or 46'S,) markedly so. The great majority of cases therefore tend to be over-conscientious, rigid, ruminative individuals with phobias and a tendency to compulsions. 35 out of 63 (or 550%) have always been anxious individuals. 8 patients (13 %) showed previous hypochondriasis and 13 (20%) had hvsterical trends. During the illness 45 patients (71°%) exhibited an obsessional state, and 37 (59'%,) were depressed. It is surprising, despite the alleged significant relationship between migraine and obsessionality, that 24 out of 63 (38 00) suffered, or suffer, from migraine and there is an immediate family history of migraine in 13 cases (21 %,). 10 cases in the series gave a history of migraine in the family although not affected themselves. An interesting clinical observation is that many cases when questioned state that the migraine attacks ceased with the onset of depersonalization. Previous writers, such as Oberndorf [431 and Schilder [44] , stressed the close association between the phenomena of deja vit and depersonalization. 39 cases out of 63 (620) in our series experienced this, the majority frequently. An actual historv of depersonalization in the family is rarely obtained, but striking cases do occur. In onlv 2 cases were such histories obtained. There is a history of allergy in some form in one member of the family in 11 cases, and in only 2 cases is there anv familv historv of chorea. 13 patients out of 63 give a personal history of allergy.
In the mechanism of depersonalization the father relationship has been stressed bv psycho-analysts. An investigation of our cases shows that of the 48 cases on which we could obtain information about the father-child relationship, 32 patients were fearful and frightened of their father in childhood, and used various expressions such as harsh, strict, bad-tempered, without affection, when talking about this parent. 16 patients stated that their childhood was satisfactory or that their father was good to them. This preponderance of an unsatisfactory parent-child relationship is significant. Rorschach Findings.
We discussed various ways of obtaining supplementary data on personality bv psychometric methods. It was finally decided to use the Rorschach test. Protocols were taken, individually, from 18 men and 22 women, all unselected. The ages ranged from 20 to 44 (average 28) for the men, and 15 to 48 (average 30) for the women. The spontaneous record was followed bv the usual inquirv, but there wvas no "Testing of Limits".
Looking at the results as a whole with all its interrelated parts, the general impression is that of constrictive control of a kind associated with the obsessive-compulsive personalitv. Some of the signs were: An excess of concepts determined purely by shape (in 80% of cases), over-emphasis on rare and minute details (30'%, of cases), the high percentage of failures to respond (25% of cases), the ratio of wvhole (intellectual) to kinaesthetic (creative) responses, the orderly or rigid way of dealing with the location categories, and the restricted range of the subject-matter (in 45(,) of the cases). M\Iany were meticulous in regard to accuracy of form, and there was a distinct compulsion to deal with the cards over-thoroughly before surrendering them, with reluctance. Indecision, inferred partly from conflicts in the personality-balance, could be seen directlv in the frequent alternative answers, e.g. "It could be a bat or a butterfly"; or in interrogative responses such as "Is it a . .?" or "It is a . . isn't it?
The group as a whole is intellectually superior as shown by the Rorschach criteria. The personalitv-balance on a global view of the test indicates introversion. There are two indices to be taken into account: (a) the ratio of human kiniesthetic to colour concepts, and (b) the ratio of animal movement to texture responses. The former ratio is said to reflect conscious tendencies, and the latter the more instinctive or natural inclinations not fullv accepted by the individual. It also indicated the direction in which he is at present heading. On the conscious level the group shows an ambiversive ratio, but this is overruled by the second index, from which we infer the following: that 30% of the group are introverts, 17'Y, ambiverts, 180% extraverts, while 35% show conflicting tendencies, the basic introversive trends being masked by pseudo-extraversion.
Movement responses are inadequate and the ratio of animal to human responses in this area is more than 2 to 1, a balance normal up to puberty but atypical for adults generally. Thus, we may infer emotional immaturitv, an unwillingness or inabilitv to fulfil the adult role. The question is left open as to hether the immaturity is a fixation or a regression due to psychic trauma.
Whereas the group produced 45% of its responses to the three brightly coloured cards, only 950(, of the total were determined bv colour, either wholly or partly; also, the composite reaction times were over-long for these cards, and many cases expressed a preference for the grey cards as being less of a strain. This is held to indicate that the patients were attracted towards reality but found difficulty in dealing with it.
The two extremes-of whole answer on the one hand, and tinv or rare details on the other were over-emphasized in contrast to the more obvious areas of the blots, and there was a general shortage of poputlar responses. This suggests a lack of awareness of everyday matters.
Anxiety is displayed bv almost everY subject through the different Rorschach channels, notably through colour-and-shading disturbance, and more especially the former (50% of the cases as against 18(,). The tact ttlat in 1)oth the colour and the shading categories form is still dominant shows that the anxiety is held in check, with occasional responses of the "Blood" or "Fire" type. Inner tensions, e.g. fears and hostilities, found an outlet in interpretations such as bombs, tracer buillets, or other fast-moving projectiles. Another tvpe of response suggesting aggression xvas that of violence by and to animals, e.g. A fish coming uip for the kill, lions tipped out of an airplane, caterpillar impaled and split openi, a horrible beetle that yout squash and it cracks." Responses emphasizing the horrible or evil natuLre of the things seen were fairly common.
Four cases remarked on a feeling of being drawn dow n or falling towards tlle blots. and staring eyes were common. 32 of the cases were scored for significantlv high anatomical responses, indicatinlg, in a lay grouLp suLch as this, bodv preoccLIpations.
Card VI of the Rorschach Test produced abnormal signs such as long reaction times, low productivity, failtures, &c. As this card is known to be weighted for sex, we mav infer sexual disturbance as a noticeable characteristic of the group.
Perseveration wvas another sign of constriction-i noted; inl most instances it was recognized by the patients.
In conclulsion, we may sav that the Rorschach pattern of this group of patienlts has little in common with that fouLnd in organic cases, but has most of the features indicative of psvchoneurosis with a high quantitative measure of maladjustment. This is expressed mostly in a formal, compUlsive attituLde to life. with the more positive emotions tightlv repressed or denied.
E.E.G. Finidinzgs. Electro-encephalographic investigaticns can provide us with (lata relevant to the problems of depersonalization from a number of different points of view. First, a disorder of attention, either to visuLal perceptions oi to visual imagery, wVouLld be related to the failure of the alpha rhvthm to block to stimutli. The equal presence of alpha rhythm on the two hemispheres, having a mainly post-central distribuLtion and blocked by visualization, is a demonstration of the normal resting function in the visual association areas.
Failure of blocking is seen in normal non-visualizers, and in manyv patients with reversible or irreversible deterioration of attentive capacity from anv cauLse. In the 23 cases of depersonalization examined in this series, all showed normal blocking of the alpha rhythm to opening the eves. The alpha rhvthm in one case, shoaving a poor response to this, blocked normallv when told to look. In this instance, as in others tested, the alpha blocking duirinig mental arithmetic was normal. We wvere able, in one case, to demonlstrate the return of the alpha rhythm while the eyes were open when the attention was diverted, first to auLditorv stimuLli, and then to tactuLal stimuli. These findings provide evidence of a normal phvsiological functioning of the cortical cells, and their inter-connexions in those brain areas serving visual perception and in particuLlar those in Vogt's area 19.
The second point of interest is the comparison of the groupi) as a wvhole with tlle normal populationi and rielated psychiatric groups. 13 of the 23 cases examined had minor abnormalities in the E.E.G. compared with the standards of normality at present accepted. This percentage abnormality (over 50) is extremely high for any non-organic group with the exception of the chronic psychotic mental hospital popUlation. The figure is abolut twice as great as that founid bv most workers for any mixed psychoneurotic grot1). While 5 of the E.E.G.+ grotup had received conVUlsive therapy, none of the E.E.G.group had done so, and no doubt this is a contributorv factor in making for E.E.G. abnormality.
However, when one excludes these, about 35, are still abnormal, and this is still an unusually high figure. The age factor is also probably significant, although the numbers are too small for certaintv. In the whole group the ages ranged from 19 to 42 but the average for E.E.G.+ cases was 26 vears, and for the E.E.G.cases 32 years. The significance of the age factor is enhanced by the fact that the 6 E.E.G. + cases showing instability of rhvthms to overbreathing wvere all at the votung cnd of the age range, the average being 23 vears.
Examination of the abnormalities themselves shows them to be of the minor sort. Only one case had a focal abnoimalitv and he was known to have had migraine. The grouLp was heterogeneouis. in that some had slow rhythms, some fast, and other. fast anid slow.
None, however, showed paroxvsmal activity and none rhvthms at less than 4 c 'sec. In none was any relationship to the epileptic group found, nor anv evidence of an organic process such as is given from the presence of a focus or from the characters of the wave forms. The increase of slow rhvthms during overbreathing (6 cases), and their reductioll by breathing CO. and amvl nitrite (2 cases) is in conformity wvith the findings in other cases in whom a physiological dysfunction can be inferred wvith greater certaintv. Repeated examinations made on a few cases during the illness and after recovery showed the patterns to be constant in appearance. Reduiction of slow activity by chemical action had no effect on the svmptom, and for these reasons, as well as from general principles, there is no reason to believe that the E.E.G. abnormalities are in an! wvay directly relatedl
to the mechainism of depersonalization. It would seem that they must be regarded in the same light as the E.E.G. abnormalities in the case of the psychoneurotic cases. The abnormalities are minor deviations from the normal pattern, heterogeneous variations xvhich are more frequent in the younger patients, and an expression of constitutional or developmental variation from the normal.
Responise to Treatment.
Scant attention has been paid in the past to the question of treatment in cases of depersonalization, particularly in non-psychotic cases. In involutional depression and schizophrenia the symptom tends to disappear with the improvement in the psychosis In the group with which we are concerned we find, generally speaking, that most physical methods of treatmenit may improve the affective state but seem to have little or no effect on the unreality feelings. Psychotherapy and analytical methods, of course, have been uised extensively, but in stubborn cases show little result. We have attempted an evalu- This is a treatment commonly used, and it is important for the results to be carefully assessed. The number of treatments given varied from three to fourteen. One of the cases states his depersonalization started after a course of E.C.T. Of the remaining 38 cases only 2 lost their depersonalization, 4 were improved, 1 was temporarily improved, there was no change in 22 cases, and 10 patients stated they were worse. Thus, 32 out of the 39 patients were unchanged or worse after the treatment. Of the 32, 5 were less depressed, 10 slightly improved, and 17 remained the same. Of those that recovered or were much improved, 2 were post-puLerperal, 2 were recurrent depressives, and 2 were hvsterics with depression.
There is, therefore, little or no place for the use of E.C.T. in the treatment of depersonalization where it is a clinical entity. The treatment is of value for endogenous depressions. but in stuch cases it is the depression which is relieved and the depersonaliza- Benzedrinie and epanutin. 39 cases had a course of treatment with benzedrine 10 to 20 mg. daily. 27 showed no change. 10 cases were improved, generally slightly and only in their affect; one was much improved, but there was a probability that epilepsy complicated this illness, and another case showed improvement in derealization but not in depersonalization. Epanutin in increasing doses was tried with 23 patients, 18 without effect and 5 showed slight improvement. An epileptic patient had her fits controlled by benzedrine and epanutin, but she had a sudden onset of depersonalization when under treatment.
Vasodilators. These had little or no effect. 13 cases were treated with 50 to 100 mg. t.d.s. of nicotinic acid for weeks without effect. Intravenous injections of10 c.c. Afenil (CaCI2-urea) were given daily to 7 patients for a fortnight. There was a slight relief of anxiety in 2 cases, and no change in the remainder. Ether abreactioni. It occurred to Dr. William Sargant and myself [45] that abreaction under ether as a means of excitation might be attempted in the group.
There were some interesting results in the 14 cases tried. 4 patients lost their depersonalization dramatically and have remained well. One was a female of 29 who was depersonalized for six months and becoming agitated and depressed.
She was abreacted over an incident in a bus which mounted the pavement. Great excitement was deliberately stimulated till the patient went into a state of temporary "collapse" [45] and when she came round there was immediate and lasting loss of depersonalization. Before this she had had a course of E.C.T. witholut effect. The other case was a man (f 44 who had suffered depersonalization for six years and was intensely anxiouls. E.C.T. had failed to relieve him. He had a phobia of dirt and was abreacted over an attack of pedicuLli puibis which had preceded his depersonalization. He showed tremendouls affect. The first abreaction ended in violent excitement, but as he did not reach the point of collapse he was immediately abreactcd again. Thi.s culminated in a short period of stupor, with lasting relief of symptoms. A third patient who became depersonalized three weeks after her first child was born abreacted violentlyr over her confinement experiences with good ceffect. The fouLrth patienit was a young manl who was predominantly derealized; his symptoms cleared after a general abreaction.
Among other cases of this group are, one obsessional patient of 20 persistentlv depersonalized since the age of 13 showed little affect under ether, but he reported 'minutes of normality" for some days; and an agitated obsessional woman of 24 on coming round showed rapid fluctuations of unreality and normality. A girl of 20 in the W.R.N.S. was abreacted over an incident in a classroom when she was unable to answer a question and became depersonalized. She became very excited and lost her depersonalization for several hours. She relapsed and was again abreactedl with only momentary improvement, and then became anxiotis and dissociated. Another patient of 25 who had been depersonali7ed for eleven vears, following a mo(lerate ether abreaction, lost his symptoms of derealization with diminution in intensity of depersonalization. This was onlv temporarx. A patient who was profoundlv depressed ancd depersonalized also showed a momentary loss of the symptom, whilst 2 others stated the next day that they felt something had iifted, and were relieved buLt still dlepersonalized. 3 patients failed to show any excitement under ether and there was no change. Anxiou' patients tend to respond; depressed patients remain apathetic.
Cardiazol. Cardiazol fits were reported by Sclhilder [46] to produLce some useful restults. We have not been able to investigate this finding adequately but 1 case had no resuilt from 5 fits and 2 others, who had one and two fits respectivelv, showed no chanige. The injections were given after E.C.T. had failed. The result in a fouLrth patient, however, was very interesting. He had been depersonalized for three vears and was given all intravenous injection of 6 c.c. of cardiazol whilst he was in a light stage of insulin coma. This Wcas insUfficient to produce a fit but he showed very marked twitching and generalized excitation. When the hvpoglycaemia was subsequently interruLpted bv intravenous gltucose he said he "felt lighter and evervthing appeared normal. He couLld see the trees, &c., as they uised to look". He remained well and some davs later said: "Everything is bright. as if I have come ouit of a dark room into a bright room. Something has lifted gone. I used to feel as if I was in two, but now I am whole." This result may have some similarity to the good results obtained by the induction of excitation under ether.
Modified inlsu(linZ. MNodified insulin produced physical improvement in most patients with increase in weight, but had no effect on depersonalization. Deep in1sullinl comas in 6 cases similarly produLced no benefit. Leiucotomizy. One patient had prefrontal leucotomv performed. She suddenly became depersonalize(d in 1938, three weeks after a confinement, followved bv depression and loss of interest in her babv and familv. She remained in this state, and entered a mental hospital in 1942 where she was given five cardiazol treatments without benefit. Later she had a coLurse of ten E.C.T.s and a course of sleep trcatment again without improvement. In 1944 she wvas in another mental hospital and treated unsuLccessfully with thyroid extract. She remained persistently depersonalized withl marked emotional blunting, and saidl she felt emptv and dead, aUtomatic, time meant nothing, and that nothing came from her mind. Her personality was obsessional. She was admittcd to hospital tinder Dr. Sands.
A course of analytical treatment prodtuced no change, neither dlid deep insulin comas and she became agitated, tearfuil and emotional. In March 1945, wvhen aged 39. wvith a history of seven years' continuous depersonalization, a leucotomy was performed by M\r. Wvlie M\cKissock. For a time there was little change except for an easing of tension, btit later she began to lose her depersonalization. She continued to complain at intervals of depression and lack of feeling towards her family btht there was a marked improvement nine months after the operation. Except for some irritability and temper she has now become active, regained former interests and affection tovards the family and no longer complains of depersonalization. Recentlv two further long-standing and intractable cases of depersonalization have shown marked benefit after leucotomy operation. The response to leucotomy has been promising but very few cases have so far been done and the response needs further assessment.
DISCUSSION
Our aim in this paper is to make a contribution towards the clinical, diagnostic, anid prognostic features of depersonalization, the effects of treatment, and to the discussion of the mechanism involved in the production of this svndrome. One of our difficulties has been the description of what we mean by depersonalization. Since the mechanism is not known, the definition can onlv be descriptive. Short definitions can onlv be insufficient, and a complete one would incltude aspects to which attention has been drawn by many dlifferent workers. Hlowever, the experience is distressing and seems to be essentially one of unreality; the world feels unreal; the subject feels he is unreal, totallv or partially; the svmptom never secms to have a delusional qLualitv in the tvpe of case discussed in this )aper. The patients have insight. They do not sav "I am Linreal" buLt "I feel I am not real, although I know I am." When they speak of a change in their personalitv, thev seem alwavs to refer to a sense of loss. The state bears no resemblance to the personality changes after concussion or encephalitis. The condition can occur in the early stages of all neurosis and psychosis and in some organic conditions but, as Haug [47] pointed out, it is practicallv absent in paranoia. It is rare in clhildren and senile states. The form of the illness, such as depression or schizophrenia, will determine the qtuality of the experiences, for example, hallucinations based on depersonalization. Later in a progressive psychosis the svmptom is lost, for instance it is lost in the stage of deterioration in schizophrenia. The quLestion thus arises whether depersonalization depends on an intact affect. But it appears that there is a grouip defined by this paper and with which this paper deals, in which depersoualization exists almost alone and is a clinical entity. This has been called the depersonalization syndrome. Is t-his condition dependent on an uLnknown pathophysiological process? and, in this group, is the depersonalization related specifically to such process, or is the pattern determined by genetic or constitutional factors? If depersonalization is dependent on an abnormal brain state it is clear that this group constitutes the obviotus material for investigation.
Clinically, the condition is commoner than is generally believed. Depersonalization is the fundamental experience and when it occuirs as the predominant and presenting svmptom, it has an obsessional quality. A sudden onset is often not described but is vividly remembered if recalled. There is a tendency for the patient to refer to the sudden onset as a "collapse" without further elaboration. Usually severe anxietv and fears follow it for some time, hence the frequent complaints of difficulty in breathing, sinking feeling in the stomach and so on. Depersonalization may easily be missed. Difficulties in diagnosis arise when the symptom causes marked anxiety and depression. The difficulty in describing the symptom, the perplexity to which it gives rise, and the fear of being regarded as insane, result in one or other somatic symptoms being presented, such as giddiness, pains in the head, faints, or fatigue. We have seen patients who have attended hospital for some time regarded as suffering from obsessional neturosis with anxietv in which depersonalization has passed unnoticed. Palmer [481, in discussing actute anxietv attacks in the obsessional group, says "the emphasis is laid on the psychic components, especially the unrealitv, of the anxiety attack" and that "a sense of unreality which may show itself as depersonalization or derealization, or both, mav follow or replace, or constitiite the most prominent symptom of the attack following the intense fear". We are stressing the depersonalization, and suggest that it may precede the anxiety. In some obsessional neurotics unrealitv feelings come and go. Occasionally apparent recurrent attacks of depersonalization prove to be intensifications of the symptom which has persisted throuighout in a less intense form and has been accepted by the patient. What might be called primarv idiopathic depersonalization starts suddenlv in adolescence and may last many years. Generally those cases in our group which have lasted many years with little affective disturbance are those which have begun in adolescence. Clinically, it is found that the more primary the depersonialization, the more unvarying and unyielding it is. One of the reasons the condition is found comparatively frequently in an outpatient department is that the disability accompanying the symptom is mild though persistent. It is important to recognize the presence of depersonalization because of its prognostic significance and its resistance to treatment.
The response to treatment has alreadv been fullv discussed. It is largely of a negative character. In those cases in which convulsion therapv relieves the depression but the unreality feelings appear worse, it is possible that the depression in its intense form has masked the depersonalization to some extent. Occasionally tinreality feelings follow E.C.T. Janet [49] suggested manv vears ago that in the treatment of depersonalization, excitation is required to raise what he regarded as the lowered degree of consciousness. It is therefore interesting to point out the few successful results with extreme psychological stimulation tunder ether. This has only been done in a few cases and it appears necessarv for a good result to have a lively affect and anxiety. The apathetic, dull or depressed patient responds with the titmost difficultv or not at all.
As IMayer-Gross pointed out, in discussing the mechanism of depersonalization, numerous theories advanced in the past are based on selected facts, and none satisfactorily include all facts. Thus, the folloN%ing have all been invoked as caulses of depersonalization: a "sinking in" of consciousness, a disturbance in temporal-spatial experience, an experience of the loss of volition. Or again a defence against reality, a shift in libido, or an investmenit of nulmerous phantom figures with insufficient ego libido in childhood. Finally distuLrbances at the neuro-phvsiological level, or disturbance of consciousness at its highest fulnctionial level, due to fauLltv integration and a generalized cerebral cortical dysfunction.
WNre knov the following definite facts abotut the condition which may throw some light oni its mechanism or xtiologv.
Thze positive finidinigs are: T'he onset is practically always suidden. Most typically the onset occuLrs in adolescence or earlv matuLrity.
It occurs as a symptom in a very wide range of psychiatric disorders. It can occur in normal people as a fleeting experience, for example in fatigue, after anvesthetics, and experimentally duringn mescalin intoxication. It is a reversible condition, cases can recover completely anid spontaneously.
There is a significant relationship to migraine and to obsessional traits in our cases.
The onset is significantly related to relaxation following intense or prolonged stimullation, psychological or physical. The condition may be relieved by stimulation. The symptom can be experienced in anv psychological field whether cognitive, affective or conative.
There is a distinct tendency for the symptom to occur in the more intelligent individual.
There is also a tendency for the distuLrbance to occuLr in emotionally immatture subjects.
There is a high incidence of Lunsatisfactory parental-child relationship. There is a higher incidence of non-specific mild abnormality in the E.E.G.s of this group than in any other groups except deteriorated cases.
The niegative finzdinlgs are: It is not a disorder of visuLal perception. It cannot be accounted for in neurological terms by any known focal lesioll. There is no specific relationship with anatomical disease of the brain. There is a relative absence of olfactory, gUstatory, or auditory derealization. It is extremAlv rare in children. It is practically never found in paranoia. Siilce the cxperience can occur in almost anyone tinder certain conditions, just as a convulsion can, a preformed functional pattern must be present. In those instances where the experience occurs as a significant symptom, there is evidence of a constellation of constituitional deviations. These include obsessional personality, migraine, mild nonspecific cerebral dysrhvthmia, a specific age of oniset, and relative intellectual superiority. Psvchologically the patients showv themselves as sensitive to the stresses of the child-parent relationship, emotionally immature and introverted. In such individuals, the symptom has a sudden onset, is curiously related to the relaxation following stress, and tends to respoind to stimulation of various tvpes. The mechanism of svmptom-formation cannot be adeqLuatelv considered in either physiological or psvchological terms alone, nor can any single theory related to partial function be accepted.
Dr. W. Mayer-Gross: Dr. Shorvon's interesting clinical study of depersonalization is based on a larger number of patients than any one observer has collected before. Nevertheless, I doubt if his material covers the whole range of clinical pictures in which depersonalization occurs as the leading symptom. While obsessional personalities are preponderant among his cases, he apparently included only a few subjects of cyclothymic temperament. In the latter the symptom is frequent, in fact one-third of my own patients were of this type. It seems debatable if the excess of obsessionals does not account for Dr. Shorvon's findings of unsatisfactory child-parent relationship, and also for some of his results in the Rorschach test. The onset of depersonalization in a state of relaxation after exertion is in good accord with its occurrence in normal fatigue and exhaustion. Relief of the symptom through excitation and mental effort corresponds to the relief of other psychoneurotic symptoms like stammering and phobias in situations of excitement. The results of experimental approach applied for the first time in such patients were disappointing, but not conclusive. Less conventional experimental methods should be tried and may have different results, especially as the abnormal brain potentials seem to point at a distinctive functional disturbance. Finally, I fini it difficult to agree with Dr. Shorvon's suggestion of "Primary IdioDathic Depersonalization" as a disease entity, considering the present provisional state of psychiatric classification.
We already know of a number of constitutional and incidental factors as well as illnesses on which the presence cf the symptom depends. The few c-ses in which none of these factors is found hardly justify the claim for a special class of disease.
